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ABSTRACT 
As recently as the 19th century, it was widely believed that racial groups 
varied in their physiological experiences to pain. 1 Prominent medical ex-
perts argued that whites were presumed more sensitive to pain than African-
Americans and Native Americans.2 I argue here that the perception of a 
racially based insensitivity to pain persists among judicial decision-makers 
and may be in part to blame for the intractable problem of racially disparate 
sentences in American criminal courts. This article re-conceptualizes a fa-
miliar debate by bringing together medical research in the area of pain treat-
ment and legal research in the area of race and sentencing. It considers 
broadly the implications of our apparent de-sensitivity to the pain of racial 
and ethnic minorities. 
INTRODUCTION 
A growing literature has emerged chronicling the problem of race-based 
disparity in sentencing and the failure of judges, lawmakers, and others to 
arrest it. This literature has hypothesized various explanations for this dis-
parity: institutional bias, structural biases in sentencing policy and proce-
dure, the correlation between race and extra-legal factors such as poverty, 
higher rates of criminality among racial minorities, and racial discrimina-
tion. Given the lack of consensus over the reasons for the disparity, strate-
gies to eliminate unwarranted disparities have to date proven unsuccessful. 
Significant sentencing disparities persist among criminal defendants of dif-
ferent races, and understanding the reasons for this remains one of the most 
studied questions in criminology. Even the most ambitious sentencing re-
form of the century-the move from indeterminate to determinate sentenc-
ing that has dominated state and federal criminal courts-has failed to 
resolve or significantly ameliorate the problem of racial inequity in sentenc-
ing. We have yet to figure out why. 
Various theories have been posited to explain the problem of race-
based sentencing disparities. Without addressing all the other explanations 
and hypotheses that have been offered elsewhere, I present in this paper a 
novel perspective on an old criminal law problem. Borrowing from a recent 
spate of the healthcare research on pain treatment, I consider the enterprise 
1. Kathryn E. Lasch, Culture and Pain, 10 Pain Clinical Updates 5 (2002) (citing Elizabeth 
B. Clark, "The Sacred Rights of the Weak": Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture of Individual Rights 
in Antebellum America, 82 J. Am. History 463 (1995». 
2. Native Americans in particular were seen as "virtually impervious to physical trauma," 
Id, 
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of sentencing as it relates to the assessment and imposition of pain. My 
thesis is simple: psychologists and other social scientists now realize that 
individuals have different capacities for perceiving pain and identifying 
pain in others. Beyond this, psychologists have also found that race and 
ethnicity are significant factors in pain perception and treatment. Specifi-
cally, people perceive the pain experienced by people who are ethnically or 
racially "other" differently than they perceive the pain of people in their 
own ethnic and racial groups. Arguing that the enterprise of sentencing is 
essentially the state-sanctioned imposition of pain, I contend that the devel-
oping scholarship on pain research has tremendous implications for under-
standing disparate sentences in the criminal justice system. 
This article is modest in its purpose. I aim to make the case for using 
the pain disparity scholarship (1) as a model in thinking about race-based 
sentencing disparity and (2) in framing and prioritizing future research on 
the subject. My argument proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I provide a brief 
review of the existing scholarship on race-based sentencing disparity. The 
claim of racially motivated disparities in sentencing is one of the most stud-
ied, yet under-resolved, questions in criminology. Most of the research falls 
into two primary categories: researchers either seek to verify the existence 
of race-based disparity or, having accepted the disparity as true, attempt to 
determine its causes. The focus of Part II is how pain research may help us 
gain a better grasp of the enterprise of sentencing. I explore the enterprise of 
sentencing and how it relates to the assessment and imposition of pain. In 
Part III, I examine the connection between pain and race. In particular, I 
focus on how studies on pain from the healthcare field can be marshaled to 
shed light on the problem of race-based sentencing disparities. These stud-
ies are consistent with the historical evidence on the treatment of minorities. 
In Part IV, I briefly consider the wide-ranging implications of this new the-
ory for understanding sentencing disparity, leaving a truly comprehensive 
treatment of these implications for future research. I conclude that addi-
tional qualitative research is needed to fully validate the pain theory and to 
explore responsive solutions for racial disparity in sentencing. 
I. THE INTRACTABLE PROBLEM OF RACE-BASED DISPARITIES IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
It is no longer news to anyone that the incarceration rate in the United 
States is extraordinarily high and steadily climbing. Nor is it novel that this 
high incarceration rate impacts racial minorities disproportionately? The 
statistics are staggering. The often-cited report from the Sentencing Project, 
a non-profit group critical of the incarceration trend, employs government 
3. Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 
9, 15 (1999) ("one of the most troubling features of the wave of harsh sentencing policies and 
prison-building over the past quarter century is its profound impact on the African-American 
community"). 
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data to show that one in three African-American males in their twenties are 
under the control of the criminal justice system.4 In some cities, the ratio is 
closer to one in twoS but the trend is clearly national. Although African-
Americans represent approximately 13% of the American population, they 
consist of 43% of state and federal prisoners.6 Minority youth are also over-
represented in the juvenile justice system. According to a 1995 study, al-
though minorities make up 32% of the nation's youth population, they 
account for roughly 68% of the youths institutionalized or incarcerated.7 
The bottom line is that African-Americans face a significantly higher 
probability of being prosecuted and imprisoned than whites in almost every 
type of crime.8 Numerous theories and hypotheses abound to explain this 
fact. I consider the most common explanations below. 
A. Blacks Are Imprisoned More Because They Commit More Crimes 
One argument is that the rate of criminality among blacks is higher than 
for other groups. That the arrest and incarceration rates for African-Ameri-
cans are higher than for their white counterparts is a fact that many do not 
like to admit but nonetheless appears to be accurate. For example, in 1991, 
blacks constituted under 13% of the general population but accounted for 
44.8% of those arrested for violent felonies and nearly 50% of those in 
prison.9 Though these disproportionate arrest rates for African-Americans 
have remained stable over the last decade, the disproportionate incarcera-
tion rates have increased steadily. 10 
However, it is now fairly well established-at least among criminolo-
gists if not law enforcement agencies-that arrest rates are poor indicators 
of criminalityY Law professor David Harris argues persuasively that the 
use of race as one among many factors in arrests leads to an overall higher 
arrest rate for African-Americans but a lower yield rate in terms of de-
4. Marc Mauer & Tracy Huling, Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice System: 
Five Years Later I (The Sentencing Project 1995) (available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
pdfs/rd_youngblack_5yrslater.pdt). This report was a follow-up from an earlier report issued in 
1990: Marc Mauer, Young Black Men and the Criminal Justice System: A Growing National 
Problem 3 (The Sentencing Project 1990). 
5. Id. 
6. Bureau of Just. Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (U.S. Dept. of Just. 
2001) (available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/). 
7. Melissa Sickmund, Howard N. Snyder & Eileen Poe-Yamagata, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1997 Update on Violence, http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/ 
juvoff/minority.html (1997). 
8. Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 340-42 (3d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 
1992). 
9. Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect-Race, Crime and Punishment in America 49 (Oxford U. 
Press 1995). 
10. Id. 
II. See Delbert S. Elliott, Lies, Damn Lies, and Arrest Statistics, http://www.colorado.edu/ 
cspv/publications/papers/CSPV-015.html (accessed Oct. 8, 2006). See generally David A. Harris, 
Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work (The New Press 2002). 
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tecting wrongdoing. 12 That is, overall more African-Americans are arrested 
at disproportionately higher rates than whites, but the arrests of whites are 
far more productive in yielding evidence of criminality. 13 Further proof that 
criminality does not explain the higher incarceration of African-Americans 
and Latinos is the interesting fact that the incarceration rate has continued 
to climb steadily in the last fifteen years even as the crime rate has fallen 
and stagnated. 
B. The "War on Drugs" Impacts Blacks Disproportionately 
An early goal of drafters of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was the 
increase of all federal sentences and drug sentences in particular,14 although 
of late, guideline sentences have been described as draconian by numerous 
critics. IS One element of the drug sentencing guidelines that has faced par-
ticular criticism is the differing sentencing rates for crack cocaine versus 
powder cocaine-two forms of the same drug. 16 "Crack cocaine," most 
often possessed by blacks, is punished 100 times more harshly than posses-
sion of "powder cocaine," which is more often possessed by whites.17 For 
instance, 500 grams of powder cocaine yields the same five year minimum 
sentence of 5 grams of crack cocaine. IS Supporters of this sentencing differ-
ential insist that it adequately reflects the different impact of the two drugs 
on society. Opponents characterize it as racist, or at least racially biased, 
and credit it in part for causing the significant increa.se in the African-
American federal prison population. 
While the crack versus powder differential continues to be a central 
feature in the debate regarding the guidelines and racial equity, it does not 
fully explain the racial disparity that exists in federal sentencing generally 
or even in drug sentencing particularly. In addition to increasing sentences, 
one goal of federal sentencing reform was to eliminate unwarranted dispar-
ity. However, most of the studies on the subject have found that unex-
12. David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of 
Data Collection, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 71, 81-82 (Summer 2003). 
13. [d. 
14. [d. at 72. "Indeed, in a policy statement outlining its approach to determining the severity 
of sentences, the Sentencing Commission explains that it had "not simply copied estimates of 
existing practices" in assessing drug penalties but rather followed the congressional mandate of 
"impos[ing] increased and mandatory minimum sentences." U.S. Senten. Commn., Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines Manual, Policy Statement IAl.l (Nov. 1,2005) (available at www.ussc.gov/ 
2005guidfT ABCON05.htm). 
IS. See e.g. Myron H. Thompson, Sentencing and Sensibility, N.Y. Times A23 (Jan. 21, 
2005) (available at http://se!ect.nytimes.com!searchlrestrictedlartic1e?res=FOOE12FC3A5COC728 
EDDA80894DD404482) (comparing the pre-Booker federal guidelines to Draco's laws in ancient 
Athens that spawned the adjective "draconian"); Harris, supra n. 12, at 72 (explaining that "draco-
nian sentences" for drug crimes have been a feature of the guidelines since their inception). 
16. Tonry, supra n. 10, at 41. 
17. [d. 
18. U.S. Senten. Commn., Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Drug Quantity Table 
2Dl.1 (Nov. I, 2005) (available at www.ussc.gov/2005guidfTABCON05.htm). 
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plained racial disparity persists in the post-guideline era. 19 In a brief survey 
of such research, Professor Max Schanzenbach notes that the most compre-
hensive study "found significant racial and sex disparities in length of 
prison sentence even after accounting for position on the guidelines sen-
tencing grid ... and offender demographics."20 The racial disparity per-
sisted when all other sentencing characteristics were controlled for and was 
indeed evident even when blacks and whites were sentenced within the 
same guideline range, or arguably for crimes involving the same drug type. 
Blacks sentenced within the same range as whites still ended up with longer 
prison sentences.21 
In other words, although the disparity is greatest for drug offenses, it 
exists across all crimes and demographics.22 This evidence suggests that it 
is not merely the internal structure of the guidelines or the policy decisions 
adopted by its drafters that cause the disparity. Judges themselves, even 
when their discretion is severely constrained by guidelines, exacerbate 
whatever racial inequity might already exist in the sentencing laws. There 
are numerable aspects of "the mechanism by which the federal guidelines 
permit the exercise of discretion [that] operates to the disadvantage of mi-
nority defendants."23 
C. Extra-legal Factors that Correlate with Race 
A final argument to explain the apparent race-based disparities in sentenc-
ing is that the disparity is not based on race at all but on other factors that 
correlate positively with race. The most commonly offered example is pov-
erty and the related inability to access high quality legal counsel. A signifi-
cant proportion of minority defendants are indigent and qualify for 
appointed counseU4 Appointed counsel, so the argument goes, are often 
more overworked and under-resourced than their private counterparts and 
thus are often unable to provide the same quality of representation. High 
quality representation can certainly make a significant difference in prose-
cution and sentencing outcomes. Zealous attorneys are not only better at 
putting forth affirmative defenses but are also better able to ward off poten-
19. See Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of 
District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. Leg. Stud. 57, 61-62 (2005). 
20. [d. at 62 (citing David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: 
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & Econ. 285-314 (2001)). 
21. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of 
Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug Of-
fenses, 1991-1992,31 L. & Socy. Rev. 789, 818 (1997). 
24. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 L. 
& Contemp. Probs. 81, 83, 93 (Winter 1995) (noting that a disproportionate number of public 
defender clients are minorities). 
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tial abuses from law enforcement, prosecutors, and other decision-makers.25 
More nuanced empirical research is needed to isolate the effects of factors 
such as poverty, residence, and education on sentences. At the very least, it 
is clear that even when race is not a direct factor in sentencing, defendants 
who are poor are likely to receive the harshest sentences. Because poverty 
tends to correlate with race and ethnicity, this provides an indirect race ef-
fect on minority sentences. 
In addition to offender characteristics that correlate with race, other 
extra-legal characteristics are said to interact with race to produce more 
severe sentences for African-Americans and other minorities. Studies sug-
gest "that minorities receive more severe sentences when they possess at-
tributes that reinforce stereotypes of more dangerous offenders, such as 
being male and/or unemployed."26 It may be that some of the disparities 
seen in the sentences of minorities are not really disparities based on race, 
but rather disparities based on the quality of counsel, pretrial release, juve-
nile records, or some other factor that may correlate with race and has not 
been adequately captured in existing empirical studies.27 
D. The Reality of Racial Prejudice in Sentencing 
While each of these hypotheses about the cause of race-based sentencing 
disparity has some valid explanatory power, none is wholly sufficient. In-
deed, even combined they do not adequately explain the extent of minority 
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. It has taken approxi-
mately eighty years of research, in four distinct waves, to conclude that 
sentencing decision-makers-who increasingly include prosecutors, juries, 
and probation officers as well as judges-either consciously or uncon-
sciously use race as a factor in imposing longer and more severe sentences 
on African-American defendants. Given the failure of credible explanations 
to fully account for the persistent problem of race-based disparities in sen-
tencing, it is difficult to ignore the unfortunate probability that racial 
prejudice is at least in part to blame. Indeed, painstaking reviews of decades 
of research on the subject are now providing what is as close as we can get 
to proof that racial discrimination is present in the sentencing process. 
The research on race and sentencing occurred in four waves.28 Most of 
the research conducted between the 1920s and 1960s concluded that racial 
25. William H. Edmonson, A "New" No-Contact Rule: Proposing an Addition to the No-
Contact Ruleto Address Questioning of Suspects after Unreasonable Charging Delays, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1773, 1785 (1995) (explaining that prosecutorial abuses against indigent minorities can 
compound the existing problems of racial disparity in the criminal justice system). 
26. John Wooldredge, Timothy Griffin & Fritz Rauschenberg, (Un)Anticipated Effects of 
Sentencing Reform on the Disparate Treatment of Defendants, 39 L. & Socy. Rev. 835, 837 
(2005) (citations omitted). 
27. See Schanzenbach, supra n. 19, at 62. 
28. See Marjorie S. Zatz, The Changing Forms of Racial/Ethnic Biases in Sentencing, 24 J. 
Research Crime & Delinquency 69, 71-75 (1987) (describing each of four waves of research). 
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disparities in sentencing were the result of discrimination.29 These studies 
were often criticized for their simplicity or lack of methodological rigor and 
failure to adequately control for factors such as prior record and crime seri-
ousness.30 Studies between the 1960s and 1970s were more sophisticated 
and tended to reverse the conclusions in the earlier studies, finding that 
there was little remaining discrimination based on race once crime serious-
ness and prior criminal history were considered.31 The third wave of studies 
in the 1970s and 1980s concluded largely that some racial discrimination 
still existed but had become more subtle or merely interacted with other 
variables such as pretrial release on bail, quality of counsel, unemployment, 
and gender, among others.32 The fourth (and current) wave of research 
questions the existence and extent of race-based sentencing disparities in 
the post-guideline, or "determinate sentencing" era?3 
While this fourth wave is still ongoing, existing studies confirm the 
conclusion that race and ethnicity playa direct and significant role in sen-
tencing disparities. In one of the most extensive reviews of the literature, 
Theodore Chiricos and Charles Crawford examined 38 other empirical stud-
ies conducted between 1979 and 199p4-the period marking the emer-
gence of determinant sentencing systems in state and federal courts. In their 
1995 review, Chiricos and Crawford presented significant evidence that 
race had a direct impact on imprisonment. They concluded that, overall, 
race was a lesser factor in the length of sentences but a considerable factor 
in the decision whether to incarcerate,35 noting decisively "[w]e are past the 
point of simply asking whether race makes a difference."36 
29. For a detailed review of the disparity in the literature since the tum of the twentieth 
century, see Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neu· 
tral Sentencing Process. in Criminal Justice 2000 vol. 3,427,438-42 (U.S. Dept. of Just. 2000). 
30. See John Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a 
SOCiological Viewpoint, 8 L. & Socy. Rev. 357 (1974) (finding, based on review of 17 of the 20 
studies conducted from 1928 to 1973, that the studies were methodologically unsound and failed 
to determine important extra-legal factors that might explain the disparity in sentencing). See also 
Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence 
with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 43 Am. Sociological Rev. 783, 792 (1981) (criti-
cizing 6 of 17 studies finding racial disparity for their failure to control for criminal history). 
31. Kleck, supra n. 30, at 792; William Wilbanks, The Myth of a Racist Criminal Justice 
System 112 (Brooks/Cole Publg. Co. 1987) (reviewing several studies using controls when inter-
preting sentencing variation based on race). 
32. See Zatz, supra n. 28, at 74-78; Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and 
Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, in Eth1licity, Crime, and 
Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives 311, 347-48 (Michael Tonry ed., U. 
Chi. Press 1997). 
33. Spohn, supra n. 29, at 441-42 (citing Zatz, supra n. 28). 
34. Theodore G. Chiricos & Charles Crawford, Race and Impriso1lment: A Contextual As-
sessment of the Evidence, in Ethnicity, Race, and Crime: Perspectives Across Time a1ld Place 281, 
281 (Darnell Hawkins ed., St. U. N.Y. Press 1995). 
35. /d. at 300. 
36. Id. at 301. 
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Chiricos and Crawford's literature review is illuminating but does not 
include the last fifteen years of studies conducted during the height of the 
determinate sentencing era. In a more recent examination of forty state and 
federal studies of sentencing outcomes, criminologist Cassia Spohn recon-
sidered the question of race and ethnic disparity. Spohn's research found 
conclusively "that race and ethnicity do play an important role in contempo-
rary sentencing decisions."37 Black and Hispanic offenders are more likely 
to be incarcerated and in some jurisdictions to receive higher sentences than 
their white counterparts?8 This is especially true for minorities who are 
male, young and/or unemployed-but not for similarly situated whites?9 
Spohn concluded that state and federal guidelines notwithstanding, "judges 
and prosecutors are reluctant to place offenders into cells of a sentencing 
grid defined only by crime seriousness and prior criminal record" but not 
race, gender or age.40 Like Chiricos and Crawford, Spohn notes that future 
research should attend to understanding how and why race plays a role in 
sentencing rather than whether it does SO.41 
Recognizing that racial bias plays a role in sentencing is only the start-
ing point in an inquiry regarding racial justice. The legal response to such 
bias is inadequate in part because of a failure in understanding how deci-
sion-maker bias might work and how it could possibly be addressed. Pres-
ently, the law remedies only the effects of racial animus, and only in those 
individual cases where the animus (and its distinct harm) can be clearly 
proven. The Supreme Court long ago rejected general allegations of dispa-
rate impact or indirect discrimination without proof of intentional discrimi-
nation.42 And claims of unconscious discrimination often fall on deaf ears 
because they are too difficult to tackle. Unfortunately, the problem of race-
based disparities is not unique to sentencing. Other fields have had greater 
success in analyzing, if not eradicating, the problem. In this paper, I review 
the work done in healthcare and consider its usefulness in framing future 
research for similar disparity concerns in the context of sentencing. 
37. Spohn, supra n. 29, at 458. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. at 476. 
40. [d. at 479. 
41. See Chiricos & Crawford, supra n. 34, at 301; Spohn, supra n. 29, at 480-81. 
42. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 279 (1987) (affinning death sentence despite sta-
tistical evidence of racial disparities as great as 22 to I, where defendant failed to show specific 
intent to discriminate against him as an individual by "decision-makers in his case"). 
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II. WHY IS PAIN RELEVANT TO SENTENCING? 
A. Measuring Pain as a Function of Race: A Sample Case 
At the outset, it is worth making explicit the relationship between sentenc-
ing, race, and pain. The 1934 capital murder case of Brown v. Mississippi43 
is instructive in making sense of the interconnectedness. In Brown, three 
African-American men were charged and convicted of killing their land-
lord. All three men were convicted based solely on their confessions which 
had been extracted by vicious beatings.44 One man confessed after having 
been hung repeatedly by a rope attached to a tree.45 After each denial, he 
was strung back up and finally released after the second hanging.46 When 
he continued to protest his gUilt, he was severely whipped by a deputy and 
warned that he would be whipped until he "agreed to confess to such a 
statement as the deputy would dictate."47 The other two men were stripped 
and laid over chairs while their backs were cut with leather straps. The 
whippings continued until they too confessed "in every matter of detail as 
demanded"48 by the deputy and others present. At trial, the defendants' at-
torney argued that the confessions should be excluded because they were 
involuntary. One of the law enforcement officers testified in rebuttal that 
although the men were beaten, the beatings were not so brutal as to result in 
unreliable statements. Referring to one of the men, the deputy explained 
that the beatings inflicted on him were" 'not too much for a negro; not as 
much as I would have done if it were left to me.' "49 
Brown is often cited in discussions concerning the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence on confession and interrogation law. Fortunately, the types of 
forced confessions described in Brown-as well as the terroristic and overt 
discrimination emblematic of the Jim Crow South-are largely things of the 
past. What has been overlooked about Brown, and what makes it continu-
ally worthy as a classroom text, is the lesson it teaches about race-based 
disparities in the criminal justice system. Implicit in the deputy's statement 
in Brown is the understanding that a different quantity of force is needed to 
successfully extract a confession from a "Negro" than for a white man. 
Accordingly, in assessing the reliability of a confession obtained by force, 
the decision-makers in the criminal justice system may believe that a black 
man can withstand, and indeed may require, greater pain than would be 
used against a white man to obtain the same result-whether that result be 
rehabilitation, deterrence or retribution. 
43. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The investigation began shortly after the 
crime was discovered on March 30, 1934. [d. at 281. 
44. [d. at 282. 
45. [d. at 281. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. at 282. 
48. /d. 
49. /d. at 284. 
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It is fitting to view the issue of disparate sentences from the interdisci-
plinary lens offered by pain research literature because the criminal justice 
system is essentially about the state-sanctioned infliction of pain. Sentenc-
ing is about punishment, and punishment is overwhelmingly about in-
flicting pain.50 American criminal jurisprudence has been dominated by two 
prevailing theories of punishment. Utilitarian theories contend that govern-
ment practices are morally desirable when they promote pleasure and re-
duce pain for its citizens.51 In the criminal context, utilitarian practices 
require that pain be distributed only in instances and amounts where it will 
efficaciously deter greater pain.52 For example, the infliction of punish-
ment-or state-sponsored pain-will only be morally justified where it will 
lead to an overall reduction of future pain through deterrence or rehabilita-
tion (that is, where it will reduce future crime and thus reduce future pain to 
society).53 Under utilitarian theories of punishment, the pain prevented must 
be greater than the pain caused by the punishment.54 Retributive theories 
maintain that the purpose of punishment should be to exact justice for the 
crime committed and deliver "just deserts" to the perpetrator. 55 In that 
sense, the crime must befit and be proportional with the punishment 
imposed. 56 
In their decisions regarding punishment, judges must mete out the 
proper amount to satisfy the joint goals of deterrence and retribution. Utili-
tarians require that the benefit resulting from the punishment be greater than 
the harm caused by the punishment; retributivists, on the other hand, require 
that the punishment be commensurate with the harm caused by the original 
violation. These are, of course, gross generalizations of theories that are far 
more nuanced than they often appear. Whatever one's leanings regarding 
these two theories of punishment, each requires some qualitative and quan-
titative assessment of how pain and suffering are experienced by the defen-
dant as well as the victim. How can judges, prosecutors, probation officers, 
and other decision-makers in the criminal justice process help craft 
sentences that are fair, impartial, and individual if they-either wittingly or 
unwittingly-have difficulty assessing the pain of others accurately? And 
what if one's ability to assess pain is influenced by the race of the subject? I 
50. I think it is fair to say that we are well on our way to abandoning even the fac;ade of 
rehabilitation as a principal goal of punishment. 
51. Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice vol. 4, 1336,1340 
(Sanford H. Kadish et aI., eds., Free Press 1983). 
52. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 1, 15-16, 
83-84 (John Browning ed., Clarendon Press 1843). 
53. See id. at 83-84; Greenawalt, supra n. 51, at 1338--41. 
54. Bentham, supra n. 52, at 83. 
55. Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something that Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 
88 Mich. L. Rev. 1448, 1451 (1990). 
56. See Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law 194-98 (W. Hastie trans., Augustus M. 
Kelley Publishers 1974); Dressler, supra n. 55, at 1452. 
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argue that this would, and in fact does, have tremendous implications for 
the criminal justice system. 
B. Punishment as the Imposition of Pain 
The internal sensors and barometers that we all use to detect the pain that 
others feel have important legal implications beyond the law of confession 
and interrogation. Pain used by state actors to extract confessions (i.e. tor-
ture), while still the subject of debate, is generally accepted as illegal. But 
pain in the form of punishment is widely accepted and increasingly popular. 
Punishment involving extreme physical pain is in most cases constitution-
ally impermissible under most readings of the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment, but pain remains nonetheless 
extremely relevant to punishment. Even with the advent of sentencing 
guidelines that seek to restrict judicial discretion, state and federal judges 
retain a wide array of discretion in the types of sentences they impose. Next 
to the death penalty, incarceration tends to be the most punitive.57 But in-
carceration is by no means the only method of imposing pain on criminal 
defendants. Sentences commonly include restrictions on associating with 
friends and family, limitations on movement and employment, boot camp 
or other physical labor, limits on procreation, forced labor, shaming, finan-
cial penalties, deportation, and even restrictions regarding friends and fam-
ily with whom the defendant may associate. Judges sentence based on how 
much pain they deem appropriate given the characteristics of the offense 
and the offender. Punishment is certainly not the only goal of sentencing, 
but in a sentencing regime focused predominantly on punishment, assessing 
and imposing pain is a critically important skill for the jurist. After all, pain 
is the currency of punishment; doling out punishment is essentially trading 
in pain. 
Imposing punishment is imposing pain whether one supports tradition-
ally utilitarian or retributive justifications of punishment. Utilitarian 
sentencers are consequentialists who believe that punishment is a means to 
an end. Utilitarians argue that punishment is justified when it imposes the 
minimum amount of pain or suffering necessary to achieve a particular so-
cietal good. Such "societal goods" include specific and general deterrence 
of criminal activity, incapacitation of criminals, and rehabilitation. For ex-
ample, in order to arrive at the proper punishment, a utilitarian jurist might 
try to determine the proper quantum of pain needed to deter a particular 
individual from recidivating. On the other hand, a retributive judge 
sentences in accordance to the "just deserts" of the offender. Based largely 
on the blameworthiness or culpability of the defendant, or perhaps the harm 
caused, such a judge will determine how much pain is rightly owed to the 
57. Incarceration involves intentional pain such as the loss of liberty and unintentional (but 
widely known) pain such as physical and sexual abuse at the hands of other inmates and guards. 
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defendant. Because proportionality between crime and punishment is an im-
portant element of retributive theory, a retributive jurist may need to evalu-
ate the amount of pain actually or potentially suffered by the victim in order 
to decide how much pain to "charge" the defendant. 
This is where race enters the calculus. What if the decision-makers in 
the courtroom have difficulty accurately assessing the pain of racial and 
ethnic minorities? What if our ability to "feel" the pain of others is based, at 
least in part, on their race? Pain is a fascinating construct. We know it is 
real because we each feel our own pain quite acutely. But we know the pain 
of others only because it is reported to us. Thus, we must trust these reports 
or rely on external indicators to help us interpret the existence and extent of 
the pain others feel. Pain, like remorse, can be exaggerated, faked, and mis-
interpreted. There is no reason to believe that we are good at knowing pain 
when we see it. And yet, also like remorse, ajudge's ability to identify pain 
is critical to sentencing. There is little reason to think that any of us-
including judges-can assess pain well. 
This failing can provide at least a partial explanation for the intractable 
problem of racially disparate sentencing. It is not difficult to see how this 
human failing in pain perception and assessment might lead to unwarranted 
disparity in sentencing. But why would it lead to a disparity based on race? 
The social science evidence on evaluating and assessing pain indicates that 
race plays a significant role in our view of the seriousness of the pain suf-
fered by others. From the perspective of jurists who may be (merely) exhib-
iting a lack of competency in judging pain-rather than in judging people 
and their conduct-racially disparate sentences may seem justified as being 
neither unwarranted nor indicative of intentional discrimination.58 
III. FEELING THE PAIN OF "OTHERS" 
A. Evidence in Healthcare: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Pain 
Treatment 
As in legal scholarship, healthcare scholarship includes a growing body of 
literature discussing the unequal treatment of people of color. One emerging 
area of study has been in the area of pain research. Public health scholars 
have found that pain is widely undertreated in the United States despite the 
fact that our "capacity to treat pain has never been greater."59 The problem 
of undertreatment falls disproportionately on African-Americans and non-
white Hispanics.60 Current research reveals that racial and ethnic minorities 
58. Indeed, if one considers an Aristotelian view of equality-one in which like things are 
treated alike and unlike things unalike-this difference in treatment is understandable even though 
it might be despised. 
59. Sandra H. Johnson, Introduction: Legal and Regulatory Issues in Pain Management, 26 
J. L., Med. & Ethics 265, 265 (1998). 
60. Vence L. Bonham, Race, Ethnicity, and Pain Treatment: Striving to Understand the 
Causes and Disparities in Pain Treatment, 29 J. L., Med. & Ethics 52 (2001). 
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tend to be undertreated for pain when compared with non-Hispanic 
whites.61 Scientific evidence shows that racial and ethnic disparities in pain 
assessment and treatment were found in all settings-whether post-opera-
tive, emergency room, clinical or experimental, and across all types of 
pain-whether acute, cancer, chronic, or experimenta1.62 
The disparities are consistent and astounding.63 Studies reveal that Af-
rican-Americans are more likely to be referred for the most painful medical 
treatments: blacks are more likely to undergo amputation of a lower limb, 
more likely to have testicles removed to treat prostate cancer, and more 
likely to be deprived of antibiotics upon admission for pneumonia.64 Yet, 
they are less likely to be the recipients of even relatively inexpensive 
analgesics like aspirin. In an Emory University study of acute long bone 
fractures, 90 non-Hispanic whites and 127 African-Americans received 
analgesics in 74% and 57% of cases respectively.65 
Much like the criminal law research on racial disparity, the healthcare 
studies on disparity in pain treatment consider the problem from various 
angles. Public health experts examined severity of condition, discrimination 
by decision-makers, institutional racism, structural factors in various health-
care settings, and extra-medical factors that might correlate with race like 
poverty and issues of access. After confirming the existence of a true racial 
disparity-that is, an unjustified disparity remaining even after isolating nu-
merous factors other than race-they sought to determine its causes. 
The causes of the racial disparity in pain treatment are complex, and 
the research hypotheses vary to account for the complexities. Some studies 
examine the decision-maker or healthcare provider as a possible source of 
the disparity. Examples of this include failures in pain perception, discrimi-
nation, incompetence and lack of training. Other studies consider patient-
related explanations such as communication barriers, insurance status, or 
different pain management expectations. Still others look to healthcare sys-
tem factors such as access to treatment and the availability of medication. 
Interestingly, researchers found the disparity persisted even after accounting 
for patient characteristics and issues of access.66 Failures in the assessment 
61. Id. at 53. 
62. Cannen G. Green et a!., The UnequaL Burden of Pain: Confronting RaciaL and Ethnic 
Disparities in Pain, 4 Pain Med. 277, 277 (2003). 
63. While a few representative studies are described in this article, more detailed reviews of 
the literature on pain and race are available elsewhere. For a very thorough review of the literature 
on racial and ethnic disparities, see generally id. 
64. Rene Bowser, RaciaL ProfiLing in HeaLthcare: An InstitutionaL AnaLysis of MedicaL Treat-
ment Disparities, 7 Mich. J. Race & L. 79, 85 (2001). 
65. K. H. Todd et a!., Ethnicity and AnaLgesic Practice, 35 Annals of Emerg. Med. 11, 11 
(2000); see aLso K. H. Todd et ai., The Effect of Ethnicity on Physician Estimates of Pain Severity 
in Patients with IsoLated Extremity Trauma, 271 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 925, 925-28 (1994); K. H. 
Todd et a!., Ethnicity as a Risk Factor for Inadequate Emergency Department AnaLgesia, 269 J. 
Am. Med. Assoc. 1537, 1537-39 (1993). 
66. See e.g. Todd et a!., Ethnicity and AnaLgesic Practice, supra n. 65, at 11. 
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of pain and pain intensity by the provider emerged as significant and persis-
tent causal factors for the unwarranted treatment disparities. 
B. The Decision-Maker's Failure in Assessing Pain as a Significant 
Cause of Disparity 
Physician assessment lies at the core of most treatment decisions, and for 
pain treatment this is no different. Yet it is worth noting that pain is a sensa-
tion that cannot be seen or measured objectively.67 Healthcare providers 
rely on the patient's subjective reports and on providers' own impressions 
of observable factors corroborating the patient's reports. Race appears to be 
one of the observable factors entering into the physician's calculus regard-
ing appropriate pain treatment. 68 Yet, questions remain: What is the precise 
function of race in pain assessment and treatment? Are physicians failing to 
diagnose the pain (and its intensity) in the first instance? If so, is it attributa-
ble to patient miscommunication, disinterest, or some other factor? Or do 
physicians perceive the pain of their patients and then discriminate in the 
administration of analgesic treatment? Or perhaps physicians note the pain 
and fail to offer proper treatment for reasons outside of their control such as 
patient coping mechanisms, clinic capacity or drug availability? Healthcare 
experts in pain point to the need for additional research on these questions, 
but a number of existing studies suggest some possible answers. 
One group of researchers, Emory University School of Medicine Pro-
fessor, Dr. K. H. Todd and colleagues, attempted to discern the cause of 
these racial disparities in pain assessment. They found that disparities per-
sisted even after controlling for gender, primary language, insurance status, 
injury severity, and other factors commonly associated with access to treat-
ment. 69 Probable causes for these findings may be that patients did not ade-
quately report the pain or that physicians did not understand their reports. 
Fortunately, at the time of the study, guidelines to routinize pain assessment 
were just starting to take hold in healthcare systems nationwide. Impor-
tantly, in a follow-up study after the guidelines were firmly in place, the 
researchers found that the medical records explicitly noted the existence of 
pain in nearly identical proportions for black and non-Hispanic white pa-
tients.7o The researchers thus concluded that the disparity was not merely 
attributable to the lack of effective communication between patient and 
physician.71 At least in this study, the doctors were aware of the pain and 
noted patient reports in their medical records. 
67. Allen Lebovits, The Ethical Implications of Racial Disparities in Pain: Are Some of Us 
More Equal?, 6 Pain Med. 3 (2005). 
68. Id. at 3--4. 
69. Todd et al.. Ethnicity and Analgesic Practice, supra n. 65, at 11. 
70. Id. at 14. 
71. Id. 
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Some studies considered the possibility that racial disparity in pain 
treatment is attributed to a variation among ethnic groups regarding pain 
thresholds or expectations. This possibility was determined unlikely by the 
research findings. Studies of patient-controlled pain treatment mechanisms 
permit a critical view of patients' desires and expectations in eradicating 
pain. In one study involving patient-controlled delivery of analgesics, re-
searchers studied 454 post-operative patients.72 While there were significant 
differences in the range of analgesics prescribed for ethnic groups of simi-
larly situated patients, there were no group differences in the self-adminis-
tered analgesic amount or the pain-intensity ratings.73 That is, while 
doctors' prediction of how much painkiller would be needed varied by eth-
nic group, the actual amount of analgesic administered by the patients did 
not vary by ethnic group. This significantly undermines the argument that 
certain groups have physiologically higher capacities for pain or differing 
cultural attitudes about the desirability of coping with pain that might ex-
plain a reduced need for pain treatment.74 
The fact that pain is under-treated in minority patients is consistent 
across the literature and well established in a variety of treatment settings 
and with a variety of types of pain?5 Although limited evidence exists re-
garding the cause of the under-treatment, provider-related causes remain a 
primary focus of investigation. Pain assessment by physicians is based 
largely on pain severity reports by patients as well as the social and experi-
ential background of physicians and nurses. Interestingly, patients reporting 
high pain are more likely to have their reports discounted than patients re-
porting low pain; healthcare providers typically underestimate pain in pa-
tients reporting high pain.76 A few studies specifically examine this link 
between racially based under-treatment and medical care providers. 
One particularly noteworthy study, by Duke University Professor of 
Medicine, Dr. Kevin A. Schulman, appeared in a 1999 issue of the New 
England Journal of Medicine?7 In this study, 8 actors acting as patients 
were videotaped and shown to 720 physicians. The physicians were told 
they were participating in a study of clinical decision-making, but they were 
not told the real purpose was to determine the effects, if any, of a patient's 
72. Bernardo Ng et al.. The Effect of Ethnicity on Prescriptions for Patient-Controlled Anal-
gesia for Post-Operative Pain, 66 Pain 9 (1996). 
73. Jd. 
74. Oddly, however, there are studies that suggest that African-Americans as a group have 
lower tolerances for heat pain, ischemic pain, cold pain, and pressure pain despite the fact that 
there were no measurable cross-racial differences of ratings of pain intensity. See Claudia M. 
Campbell et aI., Ethnic Differences in Responses to MUltiple Experimental Pain Stimuli, 113 Pain 
20 (2005). If anything, such studies could justify overtreatment of pain for African-Americans 
rather than undertreatment. 
75. Green et aI., supra n. 62, at 286. 
76. Id. 
77. Kevin A. Schulman et aI., The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians' Recommendations 
for Cardiac Catheterization, 340 N. Eng. J. of Med. 618 (1999). 
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race and sex on the doctor's response to reports of chest pain. All the pa-
tients followed the same script in describing their chest pain, were clothed 
identically and given comparable occupations and insurance benefits. The 
doctors were asked to determine the likelihood that each patient had a nar-
rowing of the arteries and to decide whether the patient should be referred 
to a cardiologist for catheterization-a costly state-of-the-art diagnostic 
measure. The resulting data revealed that physicians were far less likely to 
refer the black patients for the additional, potentially life-saving test based 
on their reports of pain even when ability to pay was not an issue. 
The scientific evidence is clear and uncontested in the fields of 
medicine and healthcare that the pain of African-Americans is not treated as 
effectively, as aggressively, or as frequently as the pain of white patients. In 
essence, healthcare providers regularly fail to take black pain seriously in 
the clinical setting. One might ask at this juncture, how do we know 
whether this particular phenomenon in the clinical setting is related to the 
distinct problem of disparate sentencing in the legal context? Can we gener-
alize broadly about these very distinct types of pain? Is there something 
qualitatively different about the failure to treat physical pain in the clinic as 
opposed to attempts to impose a very different type of pain in the court-
room? Undoubtedly. Further research is required in both the law and 
medicine to answer these questions with greater certainty, but historical evi-
dence strongly suggests our attitudes about pain in medicine and in law are 
not as disconnected as they might appear. Scientific assumptions about race 
and pain have historically influenced social and legal attitudes about race 
and punishment. 
C. The Desensitization to Black Pain: An Historical Link Between 
Medicine and Punishment 
Like many other forms of discrimination against African-Americans, the 
inability to perceive black pain has a legacy in slavery. The slave narratives 
and testaments are replete with story after story of cruel and sadistic behav-
ior by whites against blacks. These sorts of atrocities fill our history books 
from slavery through Reconstruction, Jim Crow, the Civil Rights era, and 
into the present. But these reports of calculated cruelty are only part of our 
history. What is just as relevant are the many centuries of learned disassoci-
ation and justified blindness, by many well-meaning whites, from the pain 
and suffering of people of African descent. 
Abolitionists' narratives about the pain, cruelty, and humiliation in-
flicted on black slaves in the antebellum South played a crucial role in the 
anti-slavery movement. Consider the testimony of a well-known abolition-
ist, Sarah M. Grimke, describing this phenomenon as she witnessed it in 
one household. She explains: 
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A handsome mulatto woman, about 18 or 20 years of age, whose 
independent spirit could not brook the degradation of slavery, was 
in the habit of running away; for this offence she had been repeat-
edly ... whipped. . . . This had been done with such inhuman 
severity, as to lacerate her back [such that] ... a finger could not 
be laid between the cuts. . . . A heavy iron collar, with three 
prongs projecting from it, was placed round her neck, and a 
strong and sound front tooth was extracted, to serve as a mark to 
describe her, in case of escape.78 
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Grimke noted that the mistress, who was by all accounts deeply religious, 
"charitable and tender-hearted," was able to spend time in the continuous 
presence of the slave as the slave conducted housework or sat nearby to 
sew. The slave, "with her lacerated and bleeding back, her mutilated mouth, 
and heavy iron collar" excited no feelings of compassion in her otherwise 
compassionate mistress. 79 
In addition to this glaring example of insouciance for immense suffer-
ing, Grimke also discussed the utter disregard that slaveholders had for their 
slaves' smaller physical and psychic discomforts. Grimke refers to these as 
the "little things" in the minutiae of daily life.80 Among the "little things" 
that Grimke reports are the fact that most families and their horses were 
provided with mosquito nets while the effect of the mosquitoes on blacks 
was never considered; one to two meals a day were provided for blacks 
with the first meal being at noon; slave children were kept seated on a cold 
staircase or outside the parlor door just to be available to snuff a candle or 
run an errand; slave relatives were separated for weeks or months at a time 
with no notice; parents often were not permitted to name their own chil-
dren.8l Grimke aptly concludes that the reason "slaveholders think nothing 
of [these sufferings]" is that "they regard their slaves as property, the mere 
instruments of their convenience and pleasure. One who is a slaveholder at 
heart never recognizes a human being in a slave."82 Imagine the difficulty 
of retraining oneself to believe that one's property has the capacity for 
pain-and that the capacity is the same as your own and others like you. 
That is the difficulty at issue here. The stories of otherwise good-hearted 
whites who fail even to see the pain of black human beings are to be differ-
entiated, I think, from the stories of unfeeling sociopathic or sadistic whites 
who enjoy or rationalize the cruelty they bestow on blacks. Even whites 
who might not harbor racial animus toward blacks often grew desensitized 
to the pain of black people. 
78. Black Women in White America 18 (Gerda Lerner ed., Pantheon Books 1972) (citing the 
testimony of Sarah M. Grimke in Theodore D. Weld, American Slavery as It Is: Testimony of a 
Thousand Witnesses (Am. Anti-Slavery Socy. 1839». 
79. Id. at 19. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 19-22. 
82. Id. at 22. 
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Nor was developing greater empathy for black pain consistent with the 
medical literature of the day. As recently as the 19th century, it was widely 
believed that racial groups varied in their physiological experiences to 
pain.83 Whites were presumed more sensitive to pain than African-Ameri-
cans and Native Americans.84 In 1851, the medical term "Dysaesthesia 
Aethiopsis" was coined by a respected New Orleans physician to describe, 
among other things, the genetic insensitivity to pain attributed to those of 
African descent. 85 According to the writings of this physician, this insensi-
tivity to pain was particularly notable when blacks were "subject to punish-
ment."86 As described previously in the case of Brown v. Mississippi,8? one 
law enforcement officer's beliefs about blacks' relative insensitivity to pain 
was relevant to interrogation techniques. It requires no great deductive leap 
to conclude that similar perceptions would have also been relevant to 
sentencing. 
And indeed they are. Reliable sentencing statistics before computeriza-
tion are difficult to obtain because of the widely diverging attention to re-
cordkeeping practices throughout the states. But it is clear that racial 
disparities existed in the late nineteenth century following slavery, and into 
the early twentieth century. The 1923 census reveals that racial disparities 
existed in 1923 but to a lesser extent than they do today. 88 In 1923, whites 
and African-Americans respectively constituted 67% and 31 % of the incar-
cerated population. Whites and African-Americans constituted 90% of the 
overall population and African-Americans alone constituted 9% of the over-
all population. These disparities are great but not nearly as large as present-
day disparities of the incarceration rate.89 
Additional disparities also existed in other aspects of punishment and 
sentencing where record keeping was more consistent. For example, the 
pardoning power of executives was utilized inequitably by race. A 1901 
study of Virginia and Louisiana showed that in Virginia, lout of every 3.5 
white men received pardons, while only lout of every 14 blacks obtained a 
pardon. In Louisiana, lout of 4.5 whites obtained clemency, while the rate 
of clemency for blacks was lout every 49.90 As for prison conditions, the 
same study showed that there were no white women in prisons in Virginia 
and Louisiana because "judges ... deemed the prison conditions unfit for 
83. Lasch, supra n. I, at 5. 
84. Id. Native Americans in particular were seen as "virtually impervious to physical 
trauma." 
85. Samuel A. Cartwright, Report on Physical Peculiarities of the Negro Race, 7 New Orle-
ans Med. Surgical J. 705 (1851). 
86. Id. 
87. See Brown, 297 U.S. 278. 
88. Joseph E. Kennedy, Drug Wars in Black and White, 66 L. & Contemporary Problems 
153. 167 (2003) (citing U.S. Census Bureau, Prisoners 1923 (1926)). 
89. See Tonry, supra n. 10. 
90. Mary Frances Berry & John W. Blassingame, Long Memory: The Black Experience in 
America 233 (Oxford U. Press 1982). 
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them."91 However, the number of black women incarcerated in the two 
states was sixty.92 Clearly, the plight of these women was more a function 
of their race than their gender. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Criminal justice reformers have made tremendous progress in addressing 
the problems of malicious and overt racial discrimination in the court sys-
tem. While "[v ]irtually no one believes that racial bias and enmity are ab-
sent,,93 altogether, it is clear that invidious bias is not the explanation for the 
disparity in how different races are treated. It seems that reformers and ad-
vocates have taken this to mean that decision-maker bias, even in its less 
direct and tangible forms, is not worthy of, or susceptible to, close examina-
tion. Not so. It is time we seek to better comprehend and dissect some of the 
less tangible causes of disparate treatment that minorities encounter in the 
legal process. 
A. Pain in Punishment: New Perspective on Sentencing Disparities 
The full impact of society's collective numbness to the pain of racial and 
ethnic minorities at sentencing is immense. The vast literature on the racial 
disparity in sentencing94 captures far better than I could here the many 
ramifications of the inability to take black pain seriously. A court's inabil-
ity-in dealing with large minority segments of the population-to make a 
fair assessment of the hardship caused by a particular measure and its im-
pact is a critical phenomenon. In addition to the judge, other decision-mak-
ers throughout the criminal process will also contribute to racial disparity if 
they have the same difficulties assessing black pain. While a comprehensive 
treatment is beyond the scope of this paper, it is fruitful for future research 
to consider briefly some of the ramifications. An insensitivity to black pain 
will affect every stage of the process. What are some of the judicial deci-
sions that might be impacted by a judge's insensitivity to pain? 
Arrest rates for African-Americans are disproportionately high given 
their population. Forty-five percent of violent crime arrests nationwide are 
of African-Americans95 even though they constitute only 12% of the popu-
lation.96 This imbalance has remained the same for at least twenty years. 
Indeed, for as long as the FBI has collected and published national arrest 
statistics, blacks have had significantly higher arrest rates than whites com-
pared to their share of the overall population.97 
91. Id. at 234. 
92. Id. 
93. Tonry, supra n. 9. 
94. See infra n. 99, n. 100, n. 109 and accompanying text. 
95. Mauer & Ruling, Five Years Later, supra n. 4, at 1. 
96. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Summary 2000 2 (July 2(02). 
97. Tonry, supra n. 9, at 52. 
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African-American arrestees are less likely to be released on bond than 
white arrestees even when severity of crime and criminal history are con-
trolled statistically.98 Bond decisions are highly discretionary and often in-
volve explaining to the judge the hardships that will befall the defendant 
and her loved ones if she is not released on bond and forced to spend the 
night in jail. Whether a defendant is out on bond at the time of sentencing is 
a significant factor in sentence severity. Not only can a defendant who was 
released better aid her attorneys in her defense but she is also better able to 
obtain employment, attend courses and provide the court with some indicia 
of rehabilitation. 
Following the arrest stage, charging practices in regard to African-
Americans also reveal racial disparities. Criminologists have found that 
even after controlling for arrest rates, criminal history, crime severity and a 
series of other factors, racial bias influenced the charging decisions by pros-
ecutors in felony cases.99 Prosecutors did not necessarily over-charge black 
defendants, but white defendants were consistently more likely to be the 
beneficiaries of dismissals and dec1inations. 1oo 
At sentencing, African-Americans receive harsher sentences than 
whites. This is true in federal as well as in state courts, and holds true across 
all types of crime. It is also true in determinate as well as in indeterminate 
sentencing systems. However, the most significant race-based sentencing 
disparity involves not the length of incarceration but the decision about 
whether to incarcerate. African-American defendants are more likely to be 
incarcerated than similarly situated whites, who are more likely to benefit 
from a judge's discretion to impose an alternative sentence. Since the ad-
vent of the sentencing guidelines, the higher incarceration rates for minori-
ties in federal court have led to an increase in race-based sentencing 
disparity.101 These high incarceration rates are devastating to the African-
American community. Approximately one-third of all young black men are 
under criminal justice supervision.102 As for black women, from the 1990s 
98. Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 
Stan. L. Rev. 987, 989-91 (May 1994) (noting a report that bail amounts for African-American 
detainees were on average 70% higher than for white detainees in Connecticut and describing 
similar imbalances in other states). 
99. Cassia Spohn et aI., The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Deci-
sion to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 Criminology 175 (1987) (a regression analysis of 
33,000 studies showing that declinations occur more frequently for white defendants). 
100. See Angela D. Harris, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
Fordham L. Rev. 13, 60 (1998); Spohn et aI., supra n. 99, at 185. 
101. U.S. Senten. Commn., Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing xiv-xvi (Nov. 2004) 
(available at http://www.ussc.gov/l5_year/I5year.htm) [hereinafter USSC Report). 
102. Nora V. Demleitner et aI., Sentencing Law and Policy: Cases, Statutes, and Guidelines 
589 (Aspen Publishers 2004). In some communities, the figures are even higher. In 1991,42% of 
young black males in Washington D.C. and approximately 56% of young black males in Balti-
more were under criminal justice supervision. See Tonry, supra n. 9, at 29-31. 
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to the present, they remain the fastest growing group in prisons and jails. 103 
The bottom line is that although African-Americans comprised 13% of the 
population, as of June 2002, they comprised 44.2% of inmates in state and 
federal plisons and local jails. 104 
Some argue that racial disparities in the criminal justice system are 
replicated in the juvenile justice system. But it may be the reverse. It is the 
disparities in the juvenile justice system that get replayed and reproduced in 
the adult criminal justice system. One reason blacks are overrepresented in 
adult prisons is that the disproportionately high prosecution of black youths 
leads to more extensive criminal histories for these populations. Criminal 
history, including juvenile criminal history, is one of the driving factors of 
sentence severity so it would be unsurprising that African-American adults 
have harsher sentences than white adults if African-American juveniles are 
being systematically prosecuted more consistently and more harshly than 
white juveniles. The sad reality is that young African-American men are 
more likely to fall under the supervision of the juvenile justice system than 
their white counterparts. lOS Some of this disparity in the juvenile system is 
due to differences in criminality but criminality alone cannot explain the 
level of the disparity.106 Most studies on the disparity in juvenile court 
show that racial and ethnic status influence decision-making at all the criti-
cal decision stages in the system. 107 Not only are black juveniles more 
likely to face harsher dispositions in juvenile court, but they are also more 
likely to be transferred from juvenile to adult criminal court. 108 Of course, 
this contributes directly to the overrepresentation of African-Americans in 
adult state and federal prisons. 
In federal court, African-Americans are less likely to receive sentenc-
ing reductions for downward departures-which involve a finding by the 
court that some aspect of the offense or offender falls outside of the 
norm. 109 Most downward departures are granted upon motion of the gov-
ernment for providing substantial assistance to law enforcement. Of all fed-
103. Demleitner et aI., supra n. 102, at 589. 
104. Id. (citing Bureau of Just. Statistics, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2002 (Apr. 
2003) (available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/abstract/pjim02.htm. NCJ 198877)). 
105. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 
Crime & Just. 189,231-32 (1998). 
106. E.g. Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A Na-
tional Repon 92 (Off. Juv. Just. & Delinquency Prevention 1995) (available at http://eric.ed.gov/ 
ERICDocs/datalericdocs2/content_storage_01/0000000b/80/24/f3/a9.pdf). 
107. /d. (discussing a review of the literature and noting that two-thirds of studies find race to 
be an influential factor in decision-making). 
108. E.g. Bureau of Just. Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001 456 (2003) 
(available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/abstract/scjsOl.htm. NCJ 196438). 
109. See Rodney L. Engen et aI., Discretion and Disparity under Sentencing Guidelines: The 
Role of Departures and Structured Sentencing Alternatives, 41 Criminology 99, 99-100 (2003) 
(arguing that departures are "windows of discretion" through which disparities arise, and finding 
that males and minority offenders are less likely to receive departures leading to sentences below 
the standard range). 
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eral sentences imposed, approximately 20% are reduced based on 
substantial assistance departures. 110 Downward departures requested by the 
prosecutor, generally for substantial assistance, constitute over 80% of all 
downward departures. III Even here, only the judge can determine the extent 
of the sentencing reduction,112 which often involves assessing the measures 
taken by the cooperating defendant to provide the information. Cooperating 
with authorities may require the defendant to jeopardize her communal and 
interpersonal relationships and even her life. l13 Only the sentencing judge 
can determine what value to place on that sacrifice, or put differently, that 
pain. 
The ability to assess pain is important for prosecutors, jurors, proba-
tion officers and other decision-makers in the sentencing process. It is criti-
cal, for instance, for prosecutors who must make charging decisions that 
will determine the final sentence. In federal cases governed by the guide-
lines and state cases involving mandatory minimums, the prosecutor's 
charging decision generally predetermines the sentence. 114 One notable ex-
ample of the prosecutor's immense discretionary power lies in his or her 
authority to decide whether to seek the death penalty in a homicide case. 
The failure to perceive black pain as commensurate with white pain surely 
helps explain why the race of the victim is such a significant factor in 
whether the death penalty is sought and imposed. 115 
B. The Role of the Decision-Maker in Sentencing Disparity 
At each stage of the criminal justice system, racial disparities result from 
the decision-makers' inability or refusal to take seriously the pain of Afri-
can-American defendants and victims. By the sentencing stage, the effects 
of earlier disparities take on exponential proportions. But let me be clear: 
the tremendous racial disparities that exist in sentencing are not solely-or 
even predominantly-attributable to decision-makers. As might be ex-
pected, virtually all the social science evidence indicates that offense sever-
110. u.s. Senten. Commn., 2000 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 57-58, tbl. 29 
(2002) (available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT12000/SBTOCOO.htm. USSCFYoo) (showing 
that 9,506 defendants out of 52,660 received downward departures for substantial assistance in 
2000); U.S. Senten. Commn., 2001 Annual Report 53, fig. G (2001) (available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/ANNRPT1200l/fig-g.pdf) (graphical representation of datafiles USSCFY97-USSCFYOI 
showing that from 1997 to 2001, the percentage of all defendants receiving downward departures 
for substantial assistance decreased from 19.3% to 17.1 %). 
111. Frank O. Bowman, III, When Sentences Don't Make Sense, Wash. Post A27 (Aug. 15, 
2003). 
112. U.S. Senten. Commn., 2005 Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual §5Kl.l(a) (stating 
that "the appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court" for reasons that may include "any 
injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family"). 
113. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Conse-
quences, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 645 (2004). 
114. See Harris, supra n. 100, at 23-24. 
115. See generally id. at 24-50. 
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ity and criminal history are still the most significant factors in sentence 
determination. Yet unexplained racial bias by decision-makers, notably 
judges and prosecutors, remains a significant yet under-addressed piece of 
the disparity puzzle. 
Some bias is caused by intentional racial discrimination, but often bias 
is the result of unconscious prejudice and stereotyping. As in the clinical 
setting, the failure of judges and prosecutors to take black pain seriously in 
the courtroom is more likely unconscious than intentional. Though the law 
is far more responsive to the former,116 both forms of bias lead to dispro-
portionately harsher punishment for minorities. A minority patient in severe 
or chronic pain is less concerned about the precise reason why her pain is 
not being treated-she just wants the pain to stop. Similarly, a criminal 
defendant serving an unjustifiably harsher sentence than she deserves wants 
her sentenced reduced. Whether the judge intentionally discriminated or un-
consciously did so is only of secondary importance. Yet decision-maker 
bias is an aspect of the disparity question that scholars and practitioners 
have abandoned as an area of research. 
One important reason decision-maker bias has not garnered the atten-
tion it deserves is because unconscious or disparate impact bias is difficult 
to quantify and even harder to prove. Healthcare researchers have not aban-
doned the investigation of decision-maker bias in the disparate treatment of 
pain. For this reason, the pain research in the healthcare literature can help 
law scholars and criminologists gain a new understanding of racial disparity 
in sentencing. 
First, the pain research refocuses attention on decision-maker bias-a 
crucial factor in sentencing disparity that law scholars have long ignored in 
efforts to reform sentencing. One reason sentencing reformers have failed to 
advocate for changes aimed at decision-makers is that such efforts often 
seem futile. In addition, allegations of bias by decision-makers may be in-
sulting, and many are reluctant to insult judges and prosecutors who toil 
away at trying to do their jobs well. In their own unabashed pursuit of an-
swers, health care scholars appear unconcerned about the good intentions of 
treatment providers. These researchers look beyond intentions to ask critical 
questions about the decision-making process. Law scholars must consider 
anew the process that lies behind the sentencing enterprise. 
Understanding both punishment as pain and disparate sentencing, at 
least in part, as the failure to properly perceive and quantify pain uniformly, 
helps create a novel framework from which to tackle the problem of racial 
inequality in sentencing. If pain assessment in health care can be compared 
with punishment assessment in criminal justice, what can the pain research 
reveal that might help improve the sentencing process? 
116. See Schulman et aI., supra n. 77, at 618-26. 
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What kinds of solutions would this new framework help inform? 
Might the inability to assess pain cross-racially support the argument for 
more minorities in judicial and prosecutorial positions? Is there any evi-
dence-medical or otherwise-that minorities are better able to take seri-
ously the pain of other minorities? Or perhaps the answer to eliminating the 
disparities in sentencing lies in improving judicial training? Another consid-
eration is that physicians have moved to more standardized pain documen-
tation and assessment techniques. Might this provide an argument in favor 
of more objective data in sentencing (e.g., guideline or other determinate 
sentencing mechanisms)? 
All of these questions raise interesting avenues for future research-
particularly qualitative research-much of which is still needed to better 
understand the "why" of racial disparity in sentencing. Recognizing that we 
may all have a racialized view of pain is a critical part of answering the 
"why" of race-based sentencing disparity, but it is only a beginning. Addi-
tional research into the connection between black pain and sentencing dis-
parities will help us gain better understanding of the causes of the disparity 
as well as their solutions. This article is a call for such additional research. 
